WORLD, Page 36Is One Germany Better Than Two?Western leaders liked to call for reunification when theythought such prayers were in no danger of being answered. Nowthey must worry about keeping Europe stableBy Walter Isaacson
"I love Germany so much," wrote the French novelist Francois
Mauriac, "that I am glad there are two of them." That phrase is
cited with increasing frequency these days, but the sentiment is
old. Clemenceau expressed it first as he wistfully reflected on the
delicate balance of power nurtured in the 19th century by Austria's
Prince Metternich. Since World War II the division of Germany has
been central both to the tensions of the cold war and to the
stability of the cold peace that accompanied it.
Throughout this period West Germany's allies paid facile
allegiance to the goal of reunification, treating with abandon the
fact that this simple dream involved some nightmarish complexities.
It was an easy wish to proclaim, since it did not seem that the
gods would ever grant it. Now, amid the widespread Western joy over
last week's freedom dance at the Brandenburg Gate, comes a more
sobering realization: the postwar division of both Germany and
Europe seems to be tumbling toward the ash heap of history faster
than preparations are being made for whatever new order might arise
in its stead.
The two alliances that have divided Europe (and Germany) for
40 years seem less urgent militarily in the Gorbachev era. But they
now must play a political role that is no less critical. At the
beginning of 1989, way back when Hungary's Communist rulers were
just considering whether to allow independent parties and Poland's
were still debating whether to talk with Solidarity, the challenge
seemed to be to find ways to ease Eastern Europe from the claws
that had clutched it for four decades. In fact, Moscow seemed all
too eager to remove those claws. So eleven amazing months later,
amid the euphoria over headlines and live telecasts that continue
to amaze, comes an added and even trickier challenge: steering
Europe toward a continent free of rivalries -- with an
unthreatening Germany in the middle and a secure U.S.S.R. on the
edge.
The foundation of the old European order was the formal
creation of two Germanys in 1949 and the decision by Chancellor
Konrad Adenauer a few years later to tether West Germany to the
Atlantic Alliance. For the Soviet Union, which subjugated East
Germany as a satellite and buffer, this meant that any war with the
West would occur on German rather than Russian soil. For the other
Europeans, it meant a respite from the problem of German
militarism. For the U.S., it made possible the creation of a strong
NATO alliance to lead the struggle for containing the Soviets.
Enshrined in the constitution that established West Germany was
the goal of reunification, but even conservative leaders there were
privately saying as recently as six months ago that this was a
theoretical aim, not an immediate one. In January East German
leader Erich Honecker said he could envision the 100-mile barbed
barrier around West Berlin that was the grotesque symbol of
Germany's division remaining in place for another century. Few
would have challenged that prediction.
Honecker was off by 99 years; the Wall lasted barely three
weeks longer than he did. Likewise, the rigid repression of his
Stalinist system is suddenly dissipating. So, at least on the
surface, the question of reunification has become more real.
Stripped of its walls and barbed wire, shorn of its oppressive
ideology, lacking history or tradition, East Germany would seem
to have little reason to exist as a separate state. The East German
dilemma, says Henry Kissinger, is that "liberalization will
undermine its reason for being."
Nevertheless, reunification of Germany into a giant that would
overwhelm Europe the way it would dominate an Olympic Games is, at
least in the immediate future, probably not likely and perhaps not
wise. Beneath the surface, there are factors even within the
Germanys that make a headlong rush to unity unlikely. Although 40
years may not be long enough to create the distinct cultural
identity that distinguishes, say, Austrians or Swiss from their
German brethren, East and West Germany have developed different
values, styles and outlooks.
Even apart from their ideological systems, two separate sets
of governmental institutions have been firmly embedded. Though most
Germans chafe at the division imposed by the loss of a war, not
everyone in the East wants to be subsumed into the Federal Republic
and ruled from Bonn. At an extraordinary news conference (both for
its candor and the fact that it took place at all), the East German
Ambassador to Washington, Gerhard Herder, replied when asked if he
saw a unified Germany, "In my dreams, yes, but being a politician
and standing with both my feet on the earth, I don't see a
possibility in the foreseeable future."
Significant moves toward unification would be difficult without
the concurrence of the rest of Europe and, more formally, the
consent of the former "occupying powers" (the U.S., Britain, France
and the Soviet Union), which technically still must approve changes
in the structure of the two Germanys. Their support for the goal
of a greater Germany will remain more rhetorical than real.
Neither neighbor nor ally is eager to see Germans achieve
through an outbreak of peace the dominance they were spectacularly
unable to win through two world wars. There was something moving
about the unusual and spontaneous singing of the national anthem
-- the third verse: "Unity and justice and freedom/ For the German
Fatherland . . ." -- in the West German Bundestag when the
announcement was made that the Wall was being opened. But it was
also a bit chilling to those for whom the famous chords of the
former Deutschland uber Alles are not so inspiring and for whom the
dream of a united German fatherland more closely resembles a
nightmare.
For some in the Atlantic Alliance, West Germany's urge to unify
eastward raises the specter of neutralism, a concern heightened by
the Gorbasms that occurred when the Soviet leader visited Bonn in
June. For its partners in the twelve-member European Community,
especially France, the economic threat of a united Germany is less
worrisome than the possibility that Bonn will become preoccupied
with pursuing its goals in Central Europe at the expense of
strengthening unity within the E.C.
Eastern Europe also has cause for discomfort. West German
leaders like to speak of their nation's historic ties to the
region; to many Poles and Czechs and Hungarians, that is as
perverse as it is true. A side benefit of the cold war was that it
alleviated, at least for a generation or two, the fears that have
existed ever since the Teutonic Knights roamed Eastern Europe in
the 13th century, taking on the Balts and the Slavs.
The U.S. and its NATO allies can play an important role in
encouraging closer ties between the two Germanys while avoiding
the instability this could engender. The organization serves both
to anchor Bonn to the West and to subsume its potential military
might into a cooperative framework. In addition, the continued
existence of NATO and the Warsaw Pact provides a rationale for
preserving two separate German states even as they converge.
Chancellor Helmut Kohl's official policy calls for solving "the
German Question" within the context of NATO and European economic
integration. The Warsaw Pact and NATO also serve the purpose of
defusing the nationalist rivalries that Europe has historically
harbored.
As the revolutionary changes in the Warsaw Pact continue,
NATO's role will inevitably become less military and more
political. Far fewer troops will be needed, and significant mutual
demobilizations in Europe will be possible if both sides agree.
Already NATO's historic mission has changed: the threat of an
invasion from the east involves sputtering Trabants rather than
Soviet tanks.
The European Community is also a stabilizing influence because
it is integrating Bonn's economy with that of its West European
partners. "The events in Eastern Europe demand that there be an
acceleration in the construction of the E.C.," says Jacques Delors,
the former French Finance Minister who now heads the European
Commission. The E.C. can help anchor the changes in Eastern Europe
by granting economic assistance, trade concessions and eventually
some form of associate membership.
The West's most immediate goal should be to encourage East
Germany to follow the path of Hungary and Poland toward a freer
economy and a more open political process. The outcome of such an
evolution need not be reunification. For the time being, the
comfort and security of all concerned could be served by having two
German states exist side by side, working in harmony the way West
Germans now do with Austrians or, for that matter, Canadians with
Americans. Eventually, the web of economic and cultural ties could
justify a form of confederation in which people and goods could
move freely between two states that retain sovereignty. As the
concept of national autonomy becomes blurred in a more unified
Europe, the question becomes more semantic than real. Secretary of
State James Baker has begun speaking of German "reconciliation"
rather than reunification.
Ultimately, the future of Germany can be determined only by
Germans themselves. Washington and Moscow will have a different
opportunity as confrontation turns to cooperation between Eastern
and Western Europe. The superpowers will want to negotiate the
speed and terms of their withdrawal in a manner that enhances the
stability that is in everyone's common interest.
Bush and Gorbachev will begin to address these questions at
the Saltwater Summit. What can two men in a boat do when they put
up their feet? Primarily, they will have the chance to assure each
other that they both are eager to avoid crackdowns in East bloc
states. The Club Med casualness will provide the perfect atmosphere
to discuss the beneficial roles that NATO and the Warsaw Pact could
play during a time of exciting but potentially dangerous
transition.
When Gorbachev began waxing eloquent about a "common European
home," he almost certainly did not anticipate the scenario that
would unfold as the renovators plunged into the task. But unlike
his predecessors, he may understand that the Soviet Union will be
more secure with neighbors who tolerate free minds, free ideas,
free speech, free markets and free movement. If handled properly,
the revolution unfolding in one country after another opens up
opportunities, unimaginable just a year ago, to create not just a
new Europe but a new and far less menacing world order.
-- James O. Jackson/Bonn and Christopher Ogden/Washington
